As a Civil War aficionado, forgive me yet another foray into the world of military masterminds. When you look to the commanders upon whom President Lincoln eventually came to rely, you will not find the most polished of speakers or the fanciest of gentlemen. Great Britain, and all the other kingdoms of Europe, made the mistake of garbing the gentry in the robes of authority on the battlefield, falling victim to the Mongols, Napolean, and ultimately the ragtag Continental Army. Our commanders differ from the great men of Europe- they are gruff, they are rough, and they are forged in the fires of combat. They knew how to fight. That's why so many of them ran for president.
In politics you have to pick your battles and face them one at a time. Chancellorsburg, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, and Appomatax all played a pivotal role in the playout of the war, but none of them constituted the war in and of themselves. For those who try to fight a national campaign and ignore the individual battles, they will lose. While a national scope plays a major role, the war turns on a series of engagements. According to Sun Tzu, one must decide where one will fight and where one can win and do the kinds of things that will help them win, even if it's discouraging one's opponents from fighting there. Pull back to states easily defended and advocate issues where you are strong and where you can exploit the weaknesses of the opponent.
Mark Levin, speaking of his experience helping Ronald Reagan's election bids in 1976 and 1980 emphasized how the victor must concurrently run two messages: A concrete plan with a few issues and a negative message that while negative is delivered with a smile. Ultimately, that strategy is the exact way that General Grant proved able to defeat the Confederates and put an end to the war. His strategy followed the plan Levin suggests: first, he set up a strong, concrete front, and pushed inevitably towards the accomplishment of both symbolic and strategic victories (Richmond, Vicksberg, New Orleans, etc.). Secondly, he dispatched Sherman through the south to cut a swath through the center of the Confederacy and undermine its message.
So, I present the Ulysses Grant Election Theorem.
Relentless siege of areas of weakness: Grant comes under some criticism for his high casualty rates, yet historians cannot argue that the war pivoted on every battle Grant won. In the west, he utilized attack from land, sea, and (although limited) the air, driving off the enemy where practical. He made sure that his men were supported, first with decisive and dependable leaders at their head and then with sufficient support from the rear to bolster their advance. Contrast that to Pickett's charge…
March through the home country and break down the effigies: When you can stir up things at home, you undermine the confidence of the populace in their army. That was precisely why Gettysburg proved so important. Had the Confederates won, they would have deftly defeated on the home turf the Federal Army. People usually win at home. They know the land. The people support them. When an enemy invades, sometimes it inspires pacifists to pick up the sword. If you can beat them on their home turf, it weakens morale.
Hit them close to home- attack them where they think themselves safe: In the 2004 election, Senator John Edwards couldn't even help John Kerry capture his own South Carolina constituency. George Washington set a precedence for American victory in this fashion when he crossed the Delaware on Christmas Day and handily whooped the Hessians. Again, that's why Lee marched into Pennsylvania, and that's why Sherman proved so effective. He marched through the most capital parts of the land, slaying the small cadres of soldiers that arrayed against him and laying waste to the infrastructure, industry, and heart of the Confederacy, where everyone thought based on Lee's success the North could never reach.
Agility, mobility, hostility: Most of the greatest disasters for both sides arose from a lack of flexibility, dedication to victory, and ability to respond to changes on the battlefield.
Fight: With rare exception, Grant was known for pushing the fight. Despite a reputation as a butcher on the battlefield, he didn't take a lot of time putting his army into array. It was precisely that attitude among previous commanders that Buford bewailed before Gettysburg.
Replace incompetents: some of the political candidates insist on keeping loyal leaders in their circle regardless of their ability. Grant, himself picked by Lincoln for his willingness to do his job, picked brigade and division commanders for their proven experience and ability on the battlefield. Since the generals back then generally marched in front of their troops, he knew that the better the men were who led the way the greater his chance to win the day.
Don't let other people do what you ought: when the heat came on, Grant took the blame for failure and waved off the fame for victory. Instead, liberal candidates use surrogates to fight their battles for them so that if they go awry they can distance themselves from the circumstances. It echoes of the verbiage we hear in Mission Impossible: "if for any reason you are captured, we will disavow all knowledge of you." Stand by your men.
Come from multiple vectors: by the time Grant came to power over the Union Army, the Confederates had lost quite a few soldiers and some of their resolve. Despite the bulwark of fortifications available around their strongholds, they generally lacked sufficient manpower to man them all. Grant deployed his forces to stretch the defenders sufficiently that tears appeared and opportunity presented itself.
Use every medium available: some of Grant's early victories came because he started using the Navy in his assaults. Challenged by Nathan Forrest's unconventional cavalry tactics, he was forced to deploy men in new ways to counter unexpected challenges. Under his leadership, Negro Troops moved from largely being contraband raider units to part of the regular army, participating in regular combat alongside other regiments.
Carry a big stick, and make sure those who represent you do likewise. Consider whom Grant chose to do certain things. He put some of his predecessors (Burnside and Meade) in as Corps commanders because that’s where they excelled. He promoted good soldiers like Sherman and Chamberlain to greater responsibility. He chose Chamberlain, who had thwarted Hood at Gettysburg, to symbolically accept Lee’s surrender. If you want to win, the figureheads must be substantive, not simply laden with glib talking points or as figureheads. Most of the famous leaders in that war began the war as Colonels.
Quick and decisive: the original premise and presumption in the North was that they would simply sweep the Confederates off the field. As such, they came ill prepared to the first battle and faced a complete rout. Grant knew he needed to build upon the Gettysburg victory and take the fight to the enemy. The best defense is a good offense. You must focus on winning as quickly and decisively as possible and not make the mistakes Democrat party candidates made in 2008.
Victorious war strategies define objectives that can be achieved and then provide the means and materials to accomplish those same aims. In politics as in war, the mercurial and ephemeral vagaries of the candidates may fire up the young and dumb, but they do not offer a vehicle to the ends. When the din of the rally dies down, people want to hear the details, and if your plan contains only flowing imagery, people will know you offer a weak front. At that point, the battle is already desperate for your campaign, and you face ultimately a dismal defeat.
When criticized by some reporters for his conduct in Algiers, the French General tasked with ending the uprising and finding the terrorists asked in rebuttal, “Does France want to win? Then France must be willing to do what it takes.”
In politics you have to pick your battles and face them one at a time. Chancellorsburg, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, and Appomatax all played a pivotal role in the playout of the war, but none of them constituted the war in and of themselves. For those who try to fight a national campaign and ignore the individual battles, they will lose. While a national scope plays a major role, the war turns on a series of engagements. According to Sun Tzu, one must decide where one will fight and where one can win and do the kinds of things that will help them win, even if it's discouraging one's opponents from fighting there. Pull back to states easily defended and advocate issues where you are strong and where you can exploit the weaknesses of the opponent.
Mark Levin, speaking of his experience helping Ronald Reagan's election bids in 1976 and 1980 emphasized how the victor must concurrently run two messages: A concrete plan with a few issues and a negative message that while negative is delivered with a smile. Ultimately, that strategy is the exact way that General Grant proved able to defeat the Confederates and put an end to the war. His strategy followed the plan Levin suggests: first, he set up a strong, concrete front, and pushed inevitably towards the accomplishment of both symbolic and strategic victories (Richmond, Vicksberg, New Orleans, etc.). Secondly, he dispatched Sherman through the south to cut a swath through the center of the Confederacy and undermine its message.
So, I present the Ulysses Grant Election Theorem.
Relentless siege of areas of weakness: Grant comes under some criticism for his high casualty rates, yet historians cannot argue that the war pivoted on every battle Grant won. In the west, he utilized attack from land, sea, and (although limited) the air, driving off the enemy where practical. He made sure that his men were supported, first with decisive and dependable leaders at their head and then with sufficient support from the rear to bolster their advance. Contrast that to Pickett's charge…
March through the home country and break down the effigies: When you can stir up things at home, you undermine the confidence of the populace in their army. That was precisely why Gettysburg proved so important. Had the Confederates won, they would have deftly defeated on the home turf the Federal Army. People usually win at home. They know the land. The people support them. When an enemy invades, sometimes it inspires pacifists to pick up the sword. If you can beat them on their home turf, it weakens morale.
Hit them close to home- attack them where they think themselves safe: In the 2004 election, Senator John Edwards couldn't even help John Kerry capture his own South Carolina constituency. George Washington set a precedence for American victory in this fashion when he crossed the Delaware on Christmas Day and handily whooped the Hessians. Again, that's why Lee marched into Pennsylvania, and that's why Sherman proved so effective. He marched through the most capital parts of the land, slaying the small cadres of soldiers that arrayed against him and laying waste to the infrastructure, industry, and heart of the Confederacy, where everyone thought based on Lee's success the North could never reach.
Agility, mobility, hostility: Most of the greatest disasters for both sides arose from a lack of flexibility, dedication to victory, and ability to respond to changes on the battlefield.
Fight: With rare exception, Grant was known for pushing the fight. Despite a reputation as a butcher on the battlefield, he didn't take a lot of time putting his army into array. It was precisely that attitude among previous commanders that Buford bewailed before Gettysburg.
Replace incompetents: some of the political candidates insist on keeping loyal leaders in their circle regardless of their ability. Grant, himself picked by Lincoln for his willingness to do his job, picked brigade and division commanders for their proven experience and ability on the battlefield. Since the generals back then generally marched in front of their troops, he knew that the better the men were who led the way the greater his chance to win the day.
Don't let other people do what you ought: when the heat came on, Grant took the blame for failure and waved off the fame for victory. Instead, liberal candidates use surrogates to fight their battles for them so that if they go awry they can distance themselves from the circumstances. It echoes of the verbiage we hear in Mission Impossible: "if for any reason you are captured, we will disavow all knowledge of you." Stand by your men.
Come from multiple vectors: by the time Grant came to power over the Union Army, the Confederates had lost quite a few soldiers and some of their resolve. Despite the bulwark of fortifications available around their strongholds, they generally lacked sufficient manpower to man them all. Grant deployed his forces to stretch the defenders sufficiently that tears appeared and opportunity presented itself.
Use every medium available: some of Grant's early victories came because he started using the Navy in his assaults. Challenged by Nathan Forrest's unconventional cavalry tactics, he was forced to deploy men in new ways to counter unexpected challenges. Under his leadership, Negro Troops moved from largely being contraband raider units to part of the regular army, participating in regular combat alongside other regiments.
Carry a big stick, and make sure those who represent you do likewise. Consider whom Grant chose to do certain things. He put some of his predecessors (Burnside and Meade) in as Corps commanders because that’s where they excelled. He promoted good soldiers like Sherman and Chamberlain to greater responsibility. He chose Chamberlain, who had thwarted Hood at Gettysburg, to symbolically accept Lee’s surrender. If you want to win, the figureheads must be substantive, not simply laden with glib talking points or as figureheads. Most of the famous leaders in that war began the war as Colonels.
Quick and decisive: the original premise and presumption in the North was that they would simply sweep the Confederates off the field. As such, they came ill prepared to the first battle and faced a complete rout. Grant knew he needed to build upon the Gettysburg victory and take the fight to the enemy. The best defense is a good offense. You must focus on winning as quickly and decisively as possible and not make the mistakes Democrat party candidates made in 2008.
Victorious war strategies define objectives that can be achieved and then provide the means and materials to accomplish those same aims. In politics as in war, the mercurial and ephemeral vagaries of the candidates may fire up the young and dumb, but they do not offer a vehicle to the ends. When the din of the rally dies down, people want to hear the details, and if your plan contains only flowing imagery, people will know you offer a weak front. At that point, the battle is already desperate for your campaign, and you face ultimately a dismal defeat.
When criticized by some reporters for his conduct in Algiers, the French General tasked with ending the uprising and finding the terrorists asked in rebuttal, “Does France want to win? Then France must be willing to do what it takes.”
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